Introduction
To introduce the logics we will be working with in this paper, we start with an example loosely based on the one from [16] . Let us imagine that Ann, Bob, and Cath are travelling by train from Nottingham to Liverpool through Manchester. Cath was sound asleep all the way, and she has just woken up. She does not know whether the train passed Manchester, but Ann and Bob know that it has not. Now, if the train driver announces that the train is approaching Manchester, then Cath, as well as Ann and Bob, knows that they have not passed the city yet. To reason about changes in agents' knowledge after public announcements, we can use Public Announcement Logic (PAL) [15] . Returning to the example, let us assume that the train driver does not announce anything, so that Cath is not aware of her whereabouts. Ann and Bob may tell her whether they passed Manchester. In other words, Ann and Bob have an announcement that can influence Cath's knowledge. An extension of PAL, Group Announcement Logic (GAL) [2] , deals with the existence of announcements by groups of agents that can achieve certain results. Now, let us assume that Ann does not want to disclose to Cath their whereabouts and Bob does, i.e. Ann and Bob have different goals. Then, it is clear that no matter what Ann says, the coalition of Bob and Cath can achieve the goal of Cath knowing that the train has not passed Manchester, that is, Bob can communicate this information to Cath. On the other hand, if Ann and Bob work together, then they have an announcement (for example, a tautology 'It either rains in Liverpool or it doesn't'), such that whatever Cath says, she remains unaware of her whereabouts. For this type of strategic behaviour, another extension of PAL -Coalition Announcement Logic (CAL) -has been introduced in [3] .
CAL joins two logical traditions: Dynamic Epistemic Logic, of which PAL is a representative, and Coalition Logic (CL) [14] . The latter allows us to reason about whether a coalition of agents has a strategy to achieve some goal, no matter what the agents outside of the coalition do. CL essentially talks about concurrent games, and the actions that the agents execute are arbitrary actions (strategies in one-shot games). So, from this perspective, CAL is a coalition logic with available actions restricted to public announcements.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no complete axiomatisation of CAL [3, 11, 4, 5] or any other logic with coalition announcement operators. In this paper, we consider Coalition and Group Announcement Logic (CoGAL), a combination of GAL and CAL, which includes operators for both group and coalition announcements. The main result of this paper is a sound and complete axiomatisation of CoGAL. As part of this result, we study the interplay between group and coalition announcement operators, and partially settle the question on their interaction that was stated as an open problem in [11, 5] .
Coalition and Group Announcement Logic

Syntax and Semantics
Throughout the paper, let a finite set of agents A, and a countable set of propositional variables P be given. The language of the logic is comprised of the language of classical propositional logic with added operators for agents' knowledge K a ϕ (reads 'agent a knows ϕ'), and public announcement [ψ]ϕ (reads 'after public announcement that ψ, ϕ holds), group [G]ϕ ('after any public announcement by group of agents G, ϕ holds), and coalition announcements [ G ]ϕ ('for every public announcement by coalition of agents G there is an announcement by other agents A \ G, such that ϕ holds after joint simultaneous announcement').
Definition 2.1. (Language) The language of coalition and group announcement logic L CoGAL is as follows:
where p ∈ P, a ∈ A, G ⊆ A, and all the usual abbreviations of propositional logic (such as ∨, →, ↔) and conventions for deleting parentheses hold. The dual operators are defined as follows:
Observe that G ϕ means that G has an announcement after which ϕ holds, and [G] ϕ means that G has an announcement such that after it is made simultaneously with any announcement by A \ G, ϕ holds. The latter corresponds to the Coalition Logic operator, but for announcements instead of arbitrary actions.
We define L GAL as the language without the operator [ G ], L PAL the language without [G] as well, and L EL the purely epistemic language which in addition does not contain announcement operators [ϕ] .
Next definition is needed for technical reasons in the formulation of infinite rules of inference in Definition 2.5. We want the rules to work for a class of different types of premises. Ultimately, we require premises to be expressions of depth n of the type
for some a ∈ A and ψ ∈ L CoGAL , atom denotes a placement of a formula to which a derivation is applied, and some ϕ's and 's can be omitted. This condition is captured succinctly by necessity forms originally introduced by Goldblatt in [13] . Definition 2.2. (Necessity forms) Let ϕ ∈ L CoGAL , then necessity forms [13] are inductively defined as follows:
The atom has a unique occurrence in each necessity form. The result of the replacement of with ϕ in some η( ) is denoted as η(ϕ).
Whereas formulas of coalition logic [14] are interpreted in game structures, formulas of CoGAL are interpreted in epistemic models. Let us consider an example of such a model first. In Figure 1 there are three agents: a (Ann), b (Bob), and c (Cath). Let p denote the proposition that 'The train has passed Manchester.' There are two states in the model M: a state w where ¬p is true, and a state v where p is • W is a non-empty set of states;
• ∼: A → P(W ×W ) assigns an equivalence relation to each agent; we will denote relation assigned to agent a ∈ A by ∼ a ; • V : P → P(W ) assigns a set of states to each propositional variable. A pair (W, ∼) is called an epistemic frame, and a pair (M, w) with w ∈ W is called a pointed model. An announcement in a pointed model (M, w) results in an updated pointed model (M ϕ , w).
is a restriction of the original one to the states where ϕ holds.
Let L G EL denote the set of formulas of the type i∈G K i ϕ i , where for every i ∈ G it holds that ϕ i ∈ L EL . These are the formulas we will be quantifying over in modalities of the form
Formula ϕ is called valid if for any pointed model (M, w) it holds that (M, w) |= ϕ. The semantics for the 'diamond' versions of knowledge, public and group announcement operators ( K a ϕ, ϕ ψ, and G ϕ respectively) are obtained by changing ∀ to ∃ and 'implies' to 'and' in the corresponding lines. The semantics for a dual of the coalition announcement operator is as follows:
, which corresponds to 'there is an announcement by agents from G, such that whatever other agents A \ G announce at the same time, ϕ holds. ' Note that following [8, 7, 2, 3, 5, 9, 11, 4] we restrict formulas which agents in a group or coalition can announce to formulas of L EL . This allows us to avoid circularity in the definition.
Axiomatisation and Some Logical Properties
In this section we present an axiomatisation of CoGAL and show its soundness.
Definition 2.5. Axiomatisation of CoGAL is a union of axiomatisation of GAL [2] , interaction axiom for group and coalition announcements A11, rule of inference for coalition announcements R6, and necessitation R4.
(A0) instantiations of propositional tautologies,
. So, CoGAL is the smallest subset of L CoGAL that contains all the axioms A0 -A11 and closed under rules of inference R0 -R6. Elements of CoGAL are called theorems. Note that R5 and R6 are infinitary rules: they require an infinite number of premises. Finding finite axiomatisations of any of APAL, GAL, or CAL is an open problem. Note also that CoGAL includes coalition logic [14] , that is all the axioms of the latter are validities of CoGAL and a rule of inference preserves validity (see Appendix A). Definition 2.6. (Soundness and completeness) An axiomatisation is sound, if for any formula ϕ of the language, it holds that ϕ ∈ CoGAL implies ϕ is valid. And vice versa for completeness.
Soundness of A0-A4, R0, and R1 is due to soundness of S5. Axioms A5-A9 and rule of inference R3 are sound, since PAL is sound [12] . Soundness of axiom A10 and rules of inference R3 and R5 was shown in [2] . We show soundness of R4, R6 in Proposition 2.7, and validity of A11 in Proposition 2.10.
Proposition 2.7. R4 and R6 are sound, that is, they preserve validity.
Proof. A proof is given in Appendix B (Proposition B.1).
Validity of A11 was stated to be an open question in [11, 5] . Informally, the idea of our proof is as follows. Let us examine the axiom:
In the antecedent, all the agents make announcements simultaneously. In the consequent, the agents in A \ G know the announcement ψ made by the agents in G. In the updated model (M ψ , w) the agents in A \ G may learn some new epistemic formulae χ which they did not know before the announcement. We need to make sure that these new formulae cannot allow them to make ϕ false. However, since ψ is true in the initial model, and χ in the updated one, agents in A \ G can always make an announcement that they know that after the announcement of ψ, χ holds. This announcement, made simultaneously with the announcement by G, 'models' the effect of announcing χ later. Returning to our example (Figure 1 ), whichever formulae ψ 1 and ψ 2 Ann and Bob announce, and whichever formula ϕ Cath learns afterwards, she can always announce [ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 ]K c ϕ simultaneously with them in the initial situation. Informally, if after Bob's announcement of ¬p, Cath learns that ¬p, she can announce: 'If you say that ¬p holds, then I will know it,' or [¬p]K c ¬p. We use this idea to prove that if the agents in A \ G can prevent ϕ after the announcement by G, then they could have prevented it before.
Due to restriction of announcements to formulas of epistemic logic, we cannot directly employ public announcement operators in agents' 'utterances.' In order to avoid this, we use the standard translation of PAL into epistemic logic. [12] is defined as follows:
Now we show that for every announcement of agents' knowledge in some updated pointed model (M ψ , w) there is an equivalent announcement in the original one (i.e. in (M, w)).
Lemma 2.9. Let a, . . . , b ∈ A. The following formula is valid for all ψ, χ a , . . . , χ b ∈ L EL :
and, by equivalence of a formula and its translation, the latter is equivalent to
We use Lemma 2.9 to show validity of axiom A11.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that for some pointed model
Let us call ψ G the formula that G can announce to enforce ϕ.
Since ψ G is true in (M, w), this is equivalent to
By Lemma 2.9, the latter is equivalent to
Proposition 2.10 allows us to prove Lindenbaum Lemma (Proposition 2.19) for CoGAL. But before that, let us show some properties of the logic. The following validity shows that if some formula ϕ can be achieved by two coalition announcements, it can be achieved by a single joint coalition announcement as well. The validity was known only for the case of group announcements in GAL [2] . We show that this also holds for coalition announcements.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix B (Proposition B.2). [5] . We settle this question by presenting a counterexample.
Proof. Let G = {a}, H = {b}, and ϕ :
Informally, ϕ says that agent b knows that the given propositional variables are true, and agents a and c do not. Consider the model M in Figure 2 (reflexive arrows are omitted for convenience). By the semantics,
Let ψ be q, and χ be . Observe that (M, ) |= K a q ∧ K b . Moreover, c does not know any formula that she can announce to avoid ϕ. An informal argument is as follows. Whatever c announces in this situation, she cannot avoid b learning p ∧ q ∧ r. In order to make a learn that p ∧ q ∧ r, c has to announce something of the form ψ → p, since she does not know the value of p herself. Formula ψ can be neither r nor q, because c does not know their truth values. Also, it cannot be a statement of b's knowledge, since in every q-world accessible by c, b's knowledge is only a reflexive arrow. It cannot be a's or c's knowledge either, since in this case a would have known p herself, and c's relation between q-states is universal.
In the consequent, we have (M, ) |= 
Completeness
In order to prove completeness of CoGAL, we expand and modify the completeness proof for APAL [7, 9, 6] . Although the proof is partially based upon the classic canonical model approach, we have to ensure that construction of maximal consistent theories (Proposition 2.19) allows us to include infinite amount of formulas for cases of coalition announcements. This corresponds to 'whatever other agents may say.' But before we start, let us state two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 2.14. Let ϕ, ψ ∈ L CoGAL . If ϕ → ψ is a theorem, then η(ϕ) → η(ψ) is a theorem as well.
Proof. A simple induction on the complexity of η.
¬ϕ is a theorem. By contraposition, we have that ψ ϕ → G ϕ is also a theorem. By R2 and distribution over implication, we infer
Now, the first part of the proof up to Proposition 2.19 is based on [7] . Definition 2.16. A set of formulae x is called a theory if and only if it contains CoGAL, and is closed under R0, R5, and R6. A theory x is consistent if and only if ⊥ ∈ x, and is maximal if and only if for all ϕ ∈ L CoGAL it holds that either ϕ ∈ x or ¬ϕ ∈ x. Proposition 2.17. Let x be a theory, ϕ, ψ ∈ L CoGAL , and a ∈ A. The following are theories: x + ϕ = {ψ : ϕ → ψ ∈ x}, K a x = {ϕ : K a ϕ ∈ x}, and [ϕ]x = {ψ : [ϕ]ψ ∈ x}.
Proof. The proof is an extension of the one from [7] (see Appendix B, Propostion B.3). Proposition 2.18. Let ϕ ∈ L CoGAL . Then, CoGAL + ϕ is consistent iff ¬ϕ ∈ CoGAL.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B (Proposition B.4).
The following proposition is a variation of Lindenbaum Lemma. Validity of axiom A11 allows us to expand the corresponding proof for APAL, and to deal with having two different quantifiers at the same time.
Proposition 2.19. Every consistent theory x can be extended to a maximal consistent theory y.
Proof. Let ψ 0 , ψ 1 , . . . be an enumeration of formulae of the language, and let y 0 = x. Suppose that for some n ≥ 0, y n is a consistent theory, and x ⊆ y n . If y n + ψ n is consistent, then y n+1 = y n + ψ n . Otherwise, if ψ n is not a conclusion of either R5 or R6, y n+1 = y. If ψ n is a conclusion of R5, we enumerate all the subformulae of ψ n which contain group announcement modalities [G] . Let η 1 ([G]ϕ 1 ) , . . . , η k ([G]ϕ k ) be all these subformulae. Then y 0 n , . . . , y k n is a sequence of consistent theories, where y 0 n = y n , and for some i < k, y i n is a consistent theory containing y n and
, and y n+1 = y k n . Now, we consider the case when ψ n is a conclusion of R6. We enumerate all the subformulae of ψ n which contain coalition announcement modalities
be all these subformulae. Then y 0 n , . . . , y k n is a sequence of consistent theories, where y 0 n = y n , and for some i < k, y i n is a consistent theory containing y n and ¬η i ([ G ]ϕ i ). By A11, this means that
A \ G ϕ) are theorems (by Lemmas 2.14 and 2.15), they and their contrapositions are already in y i n (since y i n is a theory). Thus, adding
EL as well. Finally, y is a maximal consistent theory, and x ⊆ y.
The rest of the proof is an expansion of the one from [9] . It employs induction on complexity of formulae to prove Truth Lemma (Proposition 2.25) and, ultimately, completeness (Proposition 2.26) of CoGAL.
Definition 2.20. The size of some formula ϕ ∈ L CoGAL is defined as follows:
The []-depth is defined as follows:
The [ ]-depth is the same as [], with the following exceptions.
and Size(ϕ) < Size(ψ). The relation is a well-founded strict partial order between formulae. Now, we ensure that the order of complexity is preserved. Case ] ϕ is obvious, since the public announcement on the left-hand side of the inequality is epistemic, and for any epistemic formula ψ,
[G]ϕ holds for the same reason. The cases for coalitions are identical:
• W C is the set of all maximal consistent theories,
Relation ∼ C is equivalence due to axioms A2, A3, and A4.
Proof. Suppose H(ϕ) holds, and let x be a maximal consistent theory. The proof is by induction on < Size [],[ ] -complexity of formulae. Most of the cases were proved in [9] . We prove here only remaining instances involving group and coalition announcements.
Case 
the latter holds if and only if ∀χ∈L
is a necessity form and x is closed under R6, this is equivalent to ∀χ∈L G EL ∃τ∈L Proposition 2.25. Let ϕ ∈ L CoGAL , and x be a maximal consistent theory. Then ϕ ∈ x iff x ∈ ϕ M C .
Finally, we prove the completeness of CoGAL.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that ϕ is valid and ϕ ∈ CoGAL. Since CoGAL is a consistent theory, and by Propositions 2.17 and 2.18, we have that CoGAL + ¬ϕ is a consistent theory. Then, by Proposition 2.19, there exists a maximal consistent theory x ⊇ CoGAL + ¬ϕ, such that ¬ϕ ∈ x. By Proposition 2.25, this means that x ∈ ϕ M C , which contradicts ϕ being a validity.
Conclusion
We presented CoGAL and provided a complete axiomatisation for it. The proof of completeness hinges on the validity of the axiom
Validity of the other direction of the axiom, however, is still an open question. Answering it either way, positively, or negatively, will allow us to understand better mutual expressivity of CAL and GAL. The axiomatisation of CoGAL we presented is infinitary and employs necessity forms. Finding a finitary axiomatisation is yet another open problem. An interesting avenue of further research is adding common and distributed knowledge operators to CoGAL in the vein of [1] . Additionally, since it is known that GAL, CAL [5] , and hence CoGAL, are undecidable, a search for decidable fragments of these logics is another research question. We would also like to investigate applicability of logics with group and coalition announcements to epistemic planning [10] . Finally, a complete axiomatisation of CAL without group announcement operators has not been provided yet, and it is an intriguing direction of further research.
A Coalition and Group Annoucement Logic Subsumes Coalition Logic
Definition A.1. Axiomatisation of CL is as follows:
Proof. C0 and R0 are already in CoGAL. : ψ G → ψ G ∧ ψ H ∧ χ A\G∪H ¬ϕ 1 , which means that there is a combination of ψ H and χ A\G∪H that makes ϕ 1 false. Since sets H and A \ G ∪ H comprise A \ G (on condition that G ∩ H = / 0), this means that there is some χ A\G which enforces ¬ϕ 1 . Hence, the contradiction with (1) . Similarly, we can prove that
B Proofs of Propositions
Proposition B.1. R4 and R6 are sound, that is, they preserve validity.
Proof. (R4) Assume that |= ϕ. By R2, for an arbitrary ψ, |= [ψ]ϕ. Since ψ is arbitrary, |= [ G ]ϕ; in other words, whatever agents announce, they cannot make a valid formula false.
(R6) Let (M, w) be an arbitrary pointed model. We proceed by induction on η. Base case. ∀ψ∈L G EL ∃χ∈L A\G EL : ψ → ψ ∧ χ ϕ is valid. Therefore, by the semantics, we infer validity of [ G ]ϕ.
Induction hypothesis. Assume the rule preserves validity for n(η(ψ → ψ ∧ χ ϕ) = k. We show that it holds for k + 1.
Case ∀ψ∈L G EL ∃χ∈L
[H] ϕ for some M and w ∈ W . By the semantics,
By A7, we have:
We are interested now in the third conjunct:
in the full form. We can present the set of agents A \ G as a union of G ∪ H and H \ G by expanding the right conjunct. So, we have
Since none of the universal quantifiers here is vacuous, there are particular ψ for which the conjunction holds. Formally, ∃ i∈G K i ψ i ∃ m∈H\G K m ψ m ∀ j∈A\G∪H K j ψ j : (1). Therefore, combining G and H \ G, we have
The same argument holds for the conjunction ∃χ∈L H EL ∀χ ∈L G EL : χ ∧ χ . Let us redefine our auxiliary formulae: ψ := i∈G∪H K i ψ i , ψ := j∈A\G∪H K j ψ j , χ := i∈G∪H K k χ k , and χ := j∈A\G∪H K l χ l . Thus,
In the full form, the latter is
Using A7 and A8, we can 'push' announcements into the scope of knowledge operators:
By propositional reasoning, the latter is equivalent to
Conjuncts of the form
mean that agent i can announce ψ i , i.e. what she knows now, or [K i ψ i ∧ K j ψ j ]χ i (which is equivalent to t([K i ψ i ∧ K j ψ j ]χ i )), i.e. what she will know after announcements of other agents but not necessarily knows now, or both. Since all the variants comprise L G∪H EL , we rewrite the notation. Hence, ∃ i∈G∪H K i τ i ∀ j∈A\G∪H K j τ j : (M, w) |= [ i∈G∪H j∈A\G∪H (K i τ i ∧ K j τ j )]ϕ, and at the same time (M, w) |= i∈G∪H K i τ i ( i∈G K i ψ i is equivalent to i∈G∪H K i ψ i , where agents from H announce ). And, by the semantics, this is (M, w) |= [G ∪ H] ϕ. Proposition B.3. Let x be a theory, ϕ, ψ ∈ L CoGAL , and a ∈ A. The following are theories: x + ϕ = {ψ : ϕ → ψ ∈ x}, K a x = {ϕ : K a ϕ ∈ x}, and [ϕ]x = {ψ : [ϕ]ψ ∈ x}.
Proof. We just expand the proof from [7] by showing that corresponding theories are closed under R5 and R6.
Suppose that η([ψ]χ) ∈ x + ϕ for all ψ ∈ L G EL . It means that ϕ → η([ψ]χ) ∈ x for all ψ ∈ L G EL . Since ϕ → η([ψ]χ) is a necessity form, and x is closed under R5, we infer that ϕ → η([G]χ) ∈ x, and, consequently, η([G]χ) ∈ x + ϕ. So, x + ϕ is closed under R5. Now, let ∀ψ∈L G EL ∃τ∈L A\G EL : η(ψ → ψ ∧ τ χ) ∈ x + ϕ. It means that ∀ψ∈L G EL ∃τ∈L A\G EL : ϕ → η(ψ → ψ ∧ τ χ) ∈ x. Since ϕ → η(ψ → ψ ∧ τ χ) is a necessity form, and x is closed under R6, we infer that ϕ → η([ G ]χ) ∈ x, and, consequently, η([ G ]χ) ∈ x + ϕ. So, x + ϕ is closed under R6. Suppose that η([ψ]χ) ∈ K a x for all ψ ∈ L G EL . It means that K a η([ψ]χ) ∈ x for all ψ ∈ L G EL . Since K a η([ψ]χ) is a necessity form, and x is closed under R5, we infer that K a η([G]χ) ∈ x, and, consequently, η([G]χ) ∈ K a x. So, K a x is closed under R5. Now, let ∀ψ∈L G EL ∃τ∈L A\G EL : η(ψ → ψ ∧ τ χ) ∈ K a x. It means that ∀ψ∈L G EL ∃τ∈L A\G EL : K a η(ψ → ψ ∧ τ χ) ∈ x. Since K a η(ψ → ψ ∧ τ χ) is a necessity form, and x is closed under R6, we infer that K a η([ G ]χ) ∈ x, and, consequently, η([ G ]χ) ∈ K a x. So, K a x is closed under R6. Proof. From left to right. Suppose to the contrary that CoGAL + ϕ is consistent and ¬ϕ ∈ CoGAL. Then, having both ϕ and ¬ϕ means that ⊥ ∈ CoGAL + ϕ, which contradicts to CoGAL + ϕ being consistent.
From right to left. Let us consider the contrapositive: if CoGAL + ϕ is inconsistent, then ¬ϕ ∈ CoGAL. Since CoGAL+ϕ is inconsistent, ⊥ ∈ CoGAL+ϕ, or, by Proposition B.3, ϕ → ⊥ ∈ CoGAL. By consistency of CoGAL and propositional reasoning, we have that ¬ϕ ∈ CoGAL.
